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ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. State capacity matters for growth. I test Bates’ explanation of pre-colonial
African states. He argues that trade across ecological boundaries promoted states. I find
that African societies in ecologically diverse environments had more centralized states.
This is robust to reverse causation, omitted heterogeneity, and alternative interpretations
of the link between diversity and states. Ecological diversity also predicts states outside
of Africa. I test mechanisms connecting trade to states, and find that trade supported
class stratification between rulers and ruled. I underscore the importance of ethnic insti-
tutions and inform our knowledge of the effects of geography and trade on institutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
States that can collect taxes, protect property, and sustain markets matter for devel-
opment. State capacity positively predicts economic growth (Rauch and Evans, 2000).
Many variables that explain cross-country income differences require a state strong
enough to provide them. These include social infrastructure (Hall and Jones, 1999), in-
stitutional quality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), and investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000).
Weak states under-invest in public goods (Acemoglu, 2005). It is not only modern states
that matter; state antiquity predicts economic growth, political stability, and institu-
tional quality in the present day (Bockstette et al., 2002). The determinants of state ca-
pacity, then, are important components of modern growth.
In this paper, I test a “Ricardian” theory of states in sub-Saharan Africa originally pre-
sented by Bates (1983). Building on earlier views,1 he argues that long-distance trade
gave rise to states in Africa. His model is verbal:
[T]he contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and thereby
to render production and exchange possible for members of society. The
origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be reaped through
the promotion of markets.
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He suggests that gains from trade are greatest where products from one ecological zone
can be traded for products from another. It is near ecological boundaries, then, that
we should expect to see states. To support his view, he takes 34 pre-colonial African
societies, and shows that the proportion of societies with central monarchs is greater on
an ecological boundary.2
Bates’ view has been overlooked because his small sample and lack of controls pre-
vent him from making a credible econometric argument that this correlation is causal.
In this paper, I use ethnographic and geographic data to overcome this limitation. I
merge data on state centralization for 440 ethnic groups in pre-colonial sub-Saharan
Africa with a map of African ecological zones. I use ethnic-level ecological diversity to
proxy for the gains from trade. I show that ecological diversity is strongly related to the
presence of pre-colonial states. For example, within the societies classified as “Equato-
rial Bantu,” the Luba score .69 on the diversity index and 3 out of 4 on the centralization
index. The Kela and Ndonko, by contrast, have no diversity and no centralization. On
the “Guinea Coast,” the Yoruba score 3 on centralization and .58 on diversity, while the
Yako score zero on both.
I show that this result is robust. I use spatial variation in rainfall to control for pos-
sible reverse causation. The result survives additional controls, checks for unobserved
heterogeneity, alternative estimation strategies, removing influential observations, and
alternative measures of trade and states. I show that the “Ricardian” view better explains
the relationship between states and diverse ecology than six alternative interpretations.
These are: first, larger territories are more diverse and require more levels of administra-
tion; second, societies that independently develop states conquer trading regions; third,
dense population in diverse regions explains statehood; fourth, defense of “islands” of
land quality accounts for states; fifth, the diversity of available economic activities cre-
ates states, and; sixth, competition between ethnic groups in more diverse areas leads to
state formation. I rule out these alternative explanations by controlling for these mech-
anisms directly, by re-estimating the results using artificial countries of a uniform shape
and size as the unit of observation, and by presenting narrative evidence from the most
influential observations in the data.
Unlike Bates, I am agnostic about whether it is long-distance or local trade that mat-
ters most to state formation, and about whether trade gives rise to states by increasing
the returns to investment in public goods, by cheapening the cost of extending author-
ity over space, or by making rulers more effective in public goods provision. The public
goods provided by states can lower the costs of both inter-state and intra-state trade. In
the appendix, I present a simple model of the mechanisms by which trade may lead to
state centralization. I find that class stratification is the channel best supported by the
data, though trade is associated with a wide range of state functions. No one type of
trade emerges as most important.
2I present a condensed version of his results in the web appendix.
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Although I focus on Africa, I show that the relationship between diversity and states
holds outside of Africa. While many historians of Europe link states to the growth of
markets (e.g. Jones (1981)), historians of Africa put particular emphasis on trade (Bates,
1983). The importance of ecologically-driven trade in Africa is well documented in the
historical literature (e.g. Lovejoy and Baier (1975)). There is also particular institu-
tional continuity in Africa. Traditional authorities were often coopted by colonial states,
and their successors possess significant powers today (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Mamdani,
1996). The historical territories of ethnic groups can be measured with more precision
in Africa than in many other areas. It is in Africa that empirical studies have established
the importance of “ethnic” institutions.
My results contribute to our understanding of the importance of ethnic institutions,
of the origins of institutions, and of the relationship between trade and institutional
quality.
Institutions predating modern nation states matter for income today. These include
forms of colonial rule, land tenure, and forced labor (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2010;
Iyer, 2010). In particular, “ethnic” institutions shape modern development. These are
especially important for Africa. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) show that pre-
colonial African states better explain economic activity today than several measures of
national institutions. African countries that possessed more centralized states prior to
colonial rule have greater levels of public goods provision today (Gennaioli and Rainer,
2007). The congruence of modern African states with those that preceded colonial rule
benefits governance today (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Englebert, 2000).
States are not the only ethnic institution that matters. Local institutions of property
rights and polygamy pass smoothly over modern borders (Bubb, 2009; Fenske, 2011a),
and affect Africans’ investment incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Tertilt, 2005). So-
cial sanctions within ethnic communities help overcome collective action problems
(Glennerster et al., 2010; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). The origins of these ethnic institu-
tions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. I contribute by linking them to the
gains from trade. This origin does not make historical states uninteresting today; the
public goods that they provide in the present differ from those offered in the past. Fur-
ther, the basis of trade in Africa has been fundamentally re-oriented, both on the eve of
colonization (Eltis and Jennings, 1988) and again after independence (Head et al., 2010).
Ecological diversity should not predict trade today. Because my results distinguish this
theory of state formation from several alternatives, they help establish that the relation-
ship between ethnic institutions and present-day outcomes is causal. I show below that
historical gains from trade can be used as an instrument for ethnic institutions.
Geography shapes institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Bio-
geographical features such as population density (Acemoglu et al., 2002), crop suitabil-
ity (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), and domesticable species (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005)
have all been shown to shape the development of institutions and related outcomes.
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Other geographic explanations of states point to features such as the observability of
production (Moav et al., 2011), population density (Austin, 2008; Herbst, 2000), out-
side options (Allen, 1997), and natural boundaries (Jones, 1981) as causes of state ca-
pacity. This literature has, however, focused overwhelmingly on institutions that exist
in the present day or those that were created in the circum-Mediterranean or in Eu-
ropean colonies. Less is known about the geographic origins of institutions that have
not been built by Europeans. I provide evidence on the causes of institutions indige-
nous to Africa. Controversy remains about the power of geography to explain historical
facts such as the beginnings of agriculture (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Ashraf and
Michalopoulos, 2011). My results reaffirm geography as a force in history.
Countries with better institutions trade more (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Causation
runs in both directions; countries with better contract enforcement are able to special-
ize in products that require relationship-specific investments (Nunn, 2007), while trade
may directly improve institutional quality (Rodrik et al., 2004). Similarly, the impact
of trade on other outcomes such as growth and environmental management is miti-
gated by institutional quality (Damania et al., 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006). While some
studies have found that trade reduces corruption (Dutt, 2009; Treisman, 2000) others
have found either no effect or that corruption is only displaced (Knack and Azfar, 2003;
Sequeira, 2011). Similarly, the effects of trade on democracy may be positive (Lo´pez-
Co´rdova and Meissner, 2005), negligible (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008) or may
depend on the timing of trade reforms (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005). In this, paper, I
trace out the importance of trade for one specific institutional outcome – the central-
ization of African states.
The Ricardian view is only one of many explanations of the strength of states. In addi-
tion to the geographic theories listed above, other views stress factors such the relative
benefits of “stationary” versus “roving” bandits (Olson, 1993), the relative benefits of
different mechanisms for governing markets (Dixit, 2004) inter-state competition (Gen-
naioli and Voth, 2011; Tilly, 1992), war (Besley and Persson, 2008; Prado and Dincecco,
2012), the slave trades (Nunn, 2008; Robinson, 2002; Rodney, 1972), patronage politics
(Acemoglu et al., 2011), and past investments in state capacity (Besley and Persson,
2009, 2010). It is not within the scope of this paper to test these unless they are alter-
native interpretations of the link between states and ecological diversity.
In section 2, I describe my econometric specification and sources of data. In section
3, I present the baseline results. In section 4, I demonstrate the robustness of these
results to endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, the estimation strategy, influential
observations, and alternative measures of trade and states. In section 5, I give evidence
that the six alternative stories mentioned above do not explain the results. In section 6, I
present evidence that centralized states emerged from trade because it supported class
differentiation, that no one type of trade mattered most, and that ecological diversity
can be used as an instrument for ethnic institutions today. In section 7, I conclude.
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2. DATA
To test whether the gains from trade due to ecological diversity predict the existence of
centralized states, I estimate the following equation on a sample of pre-colonial African
societies, using an ordered probit:
(1) State centralizationi = α + βGains from tradei + x
′
iγ + i.
In this section, I explain my sources of data on state centralization, my ecological
proxies for the gains from trade, and the controls that I include in xi. I cluster standard
errors by the ethnographic regions recorded in the sample.3
To measure African states, I take data from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. This
was originally published in 29 issues of Ethnology between 1962 and 1980. It contains
data on 1267 societies from around the world.4 From this source, I use variable 33, “Ju-
risdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community” to measure state centralization. This
gives a discrete categorization between “No Levels” and “Four Levels.” The sample used
for the analysis consists of the 440 sub-Saharan societies for which this variable is not
missing.5 For comparison with Europe and Asia, the Chekiang and Japanese score a 4 on
this index, the Czechs and the Dutch score a 3, while the Lolo and Lapps each have no
centralization. I do not have data on possible substitutes for states, such as multi-ethnic
federations that coordinate tax collection.
As far as I am aware, no data exist on pre-colonial African trade that could allow com-
parison of a large number of societies. My approach is to use geographic proxies for
the capacity to trade. I follow Bates (1983) in assuming that the ability to trade across
ecological zones creates gains from trade. I use White’s (1983) vegetation map of Africa
to identify these regions.6 This classifies African vegetation into 18 major types, which
I plot in the web appendix.7 I use three measures of the ecologically-driven gains from
trade: ecological diversity, distance from an ecological boundary, and ecological po-
larization. I merge these measures with the Ethnographic Atlas using Murdock’s (1959)
3These are: African Hunters, South African Bantu, Central Bantu, Northeast Bantu, Equatorial Bantu,
Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Eastern Sudan, Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Moslem Su-
dan, and Indian Ocean.
4In particular, I use the revised Atlas posted online by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
5It is probable that stateless societies are more likely to be missing from these data. This will only bias the
results if they are more likely to be missing in ecologically diverse regions.
6This is available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/data/download/gnv031.zip.
7Altimontaine, anthropic, azonal, bushland and thicket, bushland and thicket mosaic, cape shrubland,
desert, edaphic grassland mosaic, forest, forest transition and mosaic, grassland, grassy shrubland, sec-
ondary wooded grassland, semi-desert, transitional scrubland, water, woodland, woodland mosaics and
transitions.
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map of African ethnic groups.8 This has also been used by Michalopoulos and Papaioan-
nou (2011, 2012) and in several papers by Nathan Nunn.
In section 5, I supplement this with historical and anthropological evidence from six
African societies.9 In each, the exchange of products across ecological zones was signif-
icant. My only other measure of pre-colonial trade is a map of trade routes from Brice
and Kennedy (2001). I show in Section 6 that these predict states. I do not make them a
focus of this paper, as their placement is potentially endogenous.10
Though Bates (1983) focuses on long distance trade, internal trade may also facilitate
states. A state may protect intra-ethnic trade, but it may also facilitate trade between
polities occupying two separate, internally homogenous regions. In section 6, I show
that the data cannot ultimately disentangle whether it is local trade or long distance
trade that matters most. Thus, I construct indices of the gains from both local and long-
distance trade.
The principal measure that I use of gains from trade is ecological diversity. I calculate
the share sti of each society i’s area that is occupied by each ecological type t. Ecological
diversity is a Herfindahl index constructed from these shares:
(2) Ecological diversityi = 1−
t=18∑
t=1
(sti)
2.
This is captures the opportunities for trade that exist within an ethnic group’s territory
– the gains from internal trade.
The second index that I use measures ecological polarization. This is also constructed
from the vegetation shares:
(3) Ecological polarizationi = 1−
t=18∑
t=1
(0.5− sti
0.5
)2
sti.
This measures the degree to which a society approximates a territory in which two
vegetation types each occupy half its area. Similar measures have been used for eth-
nicity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b). This also captures gains from internal
8This is available on Nathan Nunn’s website. While most groups are matched directly by name, some
require an alternative spelling, an alternative name, linkage to a supergroup or subgroup, or joining to an
ethnic group in roughly the same location. A table of these matches is in the web appendix.
9It is possible that gains from trade could arise from other forms of geographic heterogeneity. Empirically,
ecological diversity performs best. I have found no positive effect of other indices, such as ruggedness
or a Theil index of land quality on states. Area under water in White (1983) indicates rivers and lakes:
this has a negative impact on statehood if included with the baseline set of controls. Mangroves and
coastal areas are classified as “azonal,” and have no effect. The difference in land quality between the
most fertile and least fertile points in an ethnic group’s territory does predict states, but this is given a
different interpretation in section 5.
10See Michalopoulos et al. (2010). This map includes mostly routes across the Sahara or connecting Lake
Victoria to the coast. These are not correlated with ecological diversity.
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FIGURE 1. State centralization and ecological diversity
Notes: States, on the left, are from Murdock (1967). Darker regions have more centralized states. Ecolog-
ical diversity, on the right, is computed using White (1983). Darker regions are more ecologically diverse.
trade. If increasing returns to scale exist in production or trade, trade may be most prof-
itable if a society is evenly divided into two ecological zones. This would maximize the
polarization index.
The third index that I use is distance from an ecological boundary. I use the White
(1983) map to compute the average distance (in decimal degrees) of all points in a group’s
territory from the nearest boundary between two ecological regions. This captures gains
from external trade, since the boundary may lie outside the ethnic group. Because a so-
ciety that is intersected by a boundary will also be ecologically diverse, the measures of
internal and external trade will be positively correlated. Distance from a boundary does,
however, predict states even in the sub-sample of ecologically homogeneous societies.
I present maps of state centralization and ecological diversity in Figure 1.11 The most
centralized African states are clustered along an East-West line between the Sahara and
West African forest, in the microclimates of the Ethiopian highlands, along the barrier
between the equatorial rainforest and the East and Central African woodland mosaics,
and on the divide between grassland and woodland in the continent’s southeastern cor-
ner.
I join several other geographic variables to the data on ecology and states using the
Murdock (1959) map of Africa. I include these in xi as controls. Except where I note
11The base map of ethnic groups is available on Nathan Nunn’s website. While most ethnic groups can be
matched to this map directly by name, some require an alternative spelling, an alternative name, linkage
to a supergroup, or subgroup, or joining to an ethnic group in roughly the same location. A table of these
matches is included in the web appendix.
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FIGURE 2. State centralization above and below median diversity
The dark bars are for ecological diversity above the median, the light bars for ecological diversity below
it.
otherwise, I take data stored in raster format, and for each society I compute the aver-
age value of the points within its territory.12 In particular, I control for the presence of a
major river, agricultural constraints (an inverse measure of land quality), distance from
the coast, elevation, suitability for malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, dis-
tance from Lake Victoria, date of observation, crop type dummies, and distance from
each of the four major slave trades. These variables are described in more detail in the
web appendix. Summary statistics are given in Table 1. These data are that they are ad-
mittedly anachronistic – the institutional variables are recorded at an earlier date than
the geographic controls and the measure of ecological diversity. Because these variables
are slow to change, this should only add measurement error to the analysis.
3. RESULTS
I begin by showing the unconditional relationship between gains from trade and state
centralization. In Figure 2, I cut the sample into societies above and below median eco-
logical diversity. For each, I show the relative frequencies of states of each level of cen-
tralization. Below the median (the lighter bars), it is more common for societies to have
no levels of centralization, or only one level. Above the median, there is a greater preva-
lence of societies with two or three levels. As ecological variation rises, the distribution
of state centralization shifts to the right.
12Raster data taken from the following sources: Ag. Constraints, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/
LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 28; Elevation, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/; Malaria, http://www.
mara.org.za/lite/download.htm; Precipitation, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.
html, plate 1; Temperature, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 6; Rugged-
ness, http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
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Table 2 presents estimates of β. I report the full set of coefficient estimates in the web
appendix, omitting them here for space. In column 1, only the measure of ecological
diversity is included. Ecological diversity has a significant and positive correlation with
state centralization. This is robust to the inclusion of additional controls in column 2.
Few of the additional controls are significant. The exceptions are date of observa-
tion (negative), no major crop (negative), roots and tubers (positive), and major river
(positive). The negative effect of the date of observation suggests that colonial anthro-
pologists chose to first study the most centralized African societies – the low hanging
academic fruit. The negative effect of no major crop suggests that it is difficult to form a
state without an agrarian base. The positive effect of roots and tubers is likely capturing
unobservable features of forest-zone Bantu societies that better enabled them to create
states. Major rivers are associated with trade, and further support the Ricardian view of
African states. Results are similar if the length of river per unit area is used, rather than
a dummy (not reported).
Is the effect of ecological diversity large? In Table 2, I report marginal effects. The im-
pact of a one unit change in ecological diversity is to reduce the probability of having
no centralization by roughly 22-26 percentage points. The probabilities of having two
or three levels increase to match this. Ecological diversity has a bimodal distribution;
societies are clustered around peaks of zero diversity and roughly 0.5 (see the web ap-
pendix). If an ecologically homogenous society such as the Tallensi or the Yako were
to be and placed in a more typically diverse region, such as that of the Fur (0.496) or
Wolof (0.506), the probability of any centralization would rise roughly 11 to 13 percent-
age points. Mirroring this thought experiment, I replace the ecological diversity mea-
sure with an indicator for being above median diversity. The marginal effect, in Table 2,
is between 9 and 11 percentage points.
The pseudo-R2 statistics, by contrast, are low. While the effect of diversity is sizable,
the controls here cannot explain more than 10% of the variation in African states. The
estimation without controls correctly predicts the level of centralization for 42% of the
sample, barely an improvement over selecting the mode. Adding controls raises this to
only 45%. Although the bulk of pre-colonial state centralization in Africa remains to be
explained (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2012), the impact of ecologically-driven gains
from trade is robust and economically significant.
I also use Table 2 to show that the results can be expanded to cover the rest of the
world. On a sample of more than 1,000 global societies, ecological diversity continues
to predict the existence of states.13 This is true even as the sub-Saharan societies are
dropped from the analysis. I conduct as many of the robustness checks as possible in
13This sample has been created for Fenske (2011b). Details on these are given in the web appendix for
that paper.
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this global sample that I do for the sub-Saharan sample in sections 4, 5, and 6. Results
are reported in the Web Appendix.14
4. ROBUSTNESS
4.1. Validity of the state centralizationmeasure. I take two approaches to validate the
state centralization measure. First, it is strongly correlated with alternative measures of
states. Bockstette et al. (2002) and Chanda and Putterman (2007) report a country-level
index of historical state strength for the period 1850-1900, which just precedes colonial
rule for most African societies. The state centralization index has been aggregated to the
country level by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). For 41 countries, I have both measures.
Their correlation is positive and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the Standard Cross
Cultural Sample (SCCS) gives additional variables for 186 societies. It only includes 28
sub-Saharan observations, so I cannot use it in the baseline. I show in the web appendix
that several SCCS measures of state strength are positively correlated with centraliza-
tion, whether they measure the existence of a police force, the presence of taxation, or
the capacity of states to enforce their decrees.15
Second, the main result holds if I use an indicator for any levels of jurisdiction above
the local as an outcome in Table 3. This might better capture state strength if, for ex-
ample, a central authority cannot delegate functions to regional leaders without losing
some control over them. Results are similar using centralization greater than one as an
outcome (not reported).
4.2. Validity of the gains from trade measure. Results are robust to using alternative
measures of the gains from trade are in Table 3. Distance from an ecological bound-
ary and ecological polarization both predict states. Distance from a divide also predicts
states in the sub-sample of ethnic groups not intersected by a boundary (not reported).
Results using an indicator for any diversity (equivalent to intersection by a boundary)
are similar. I collapse ecological classifications from White’s map into eight “simpler”
types.16 This does not change the bi-modal distribution of diversity. I re-build the data-
set discarding slices of map in which historical population density is less than 15% of the
14Some tests cannot be carried out on the global sample due to data availability. I do not have historical
trade routes, pre-colonial cities, or salt production outside of Africa. Because the global diversity measure
is constructed using raster data that uses different classifications than White (1983), I cannot compute
distance from an ecological boundary, construct simpler ecological classes, or measure diversity within
artificial ethnic groups in the global sample.
15The centralization measure is v237 in the SCCS.
16Mountain if altimontane, other if anthropic, water or azonal, bushland if bushland and thicket or bush-
land and thicket mosaics, shrub if cape shrubland, transitional scrubland or grassy shrubland, desert if
desert or semi-desert, grassland if grassland, secondary wooded grassland or edaphic grassland mosaics,
forest if forest or forest transitions and mosaics, and woodland if woodland or woodland mosaics and
transitions.
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density of the entire ethnic group.17 These potentially irrelevant regions do not deter-
mine the results. Finally, an alternative diversity index using the Food and Agriculture
Organization’s (FAO) division of Africa into “dominant ecosystem classes” also predicts
states.18
4.3. Validity of the estimation. I use a generalized ordered probit model in the web ap-
pendix (Maddala, 1986). Results are similar to the baseline. Because multi-ethnic poli-
ties might be double-counted in the data, I down-weight all centralized societies by one
half, and the results are virtually unchanged (not reported). Major rivers and distances
from the coast, Lake Victoria, and slave trade ports may capture trade. I show in the web
appendix that excluding these controls barely affects the results. Nor does excluding the
date of observation or including country-level timing of the neolithic revolution (not
reported).19 In the web appendix, I discard influential observations. I also drop each
of the “South African bantu,” “Ethiopia/horn,” “Moslem sudan” and “Indian Ocean” in
turn, as these are the regions in which most states are concentrated. I also exclude non-
agricultural societies, societies with poor land, animal husbandry, and the desert fringe.
These do not drive the results. The main sample includes only sub-Saharan Africa; re-
sults are similar using the whole continent (not reported).
4.4. Possible reverse causation. To control for the possibility that states may shape
their environment, I use variation over space (not time) in rainfall to instrument for
ecological diversity.20 I use the log of the rainfall range as an instrument, where:
(4) Log rainfall rangei = ln(1 + (rain
max
i − rainmini )).
Here, rainmaxi and rain
min
i are the values of the raster points with the most and least
precipitation for society i. The natural log improves fit. This cannot be computed for
societies too small to have at least two raster points. Results are robust to assigning
these societies a log rainfall range of zero. Results (including the reduced-form and
first stage) are in Table 4. The IV estimates are larger than the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates. Measurement error in ecological diversity is a plausible explanation,
since vegetation classes are subjective and have imprecise boundaries. Further, ecolog-
ical diversity may be correlated with unobservable variables that hinder states. Where
ecological boundaries abut agriculturally marginal areas such as deserts and mangrove
swamps, states may have less agricultural surplus to tax.
17I use density in 1960.
18This is plate 55, downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
19Data are from Louis Putterman’s website.
20Variation over time is unlikely to predict ecological diversity, which is variation across space in vege-
tation. Further, fluctuations in rainfall over time may lead to conflict (Miguel et al., 2004), which could
directly affect state formation.
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4.5. Possible omitted heterogeneity. I show that results are robust to seven general ap-
proaches towards omitted heterogeneity in Table 5. First, I add area shares sti of each
ecological type as additional controls. Second, I include a cubic in latitude and lon-
gitude with full interactions, allowing unobservables to vary smoothly across space.
Third, I adjust for spatial autocorrelation using a spatial error model, a spatial auto-
regressive model, including the spatially-weighted observable characteristics of a soci-
ety’s neighbors, and estimating Conley’s OLS with standard errors corrected for spatial
dependence with cutoffs of 5 decimal degrees. 21 I do not use Conley’s estimator in the
baseline because the dependent variable is ordinal. I instead cluster standard errors by
ethnographic region in the baseline.
Fourth, I interact de-meaned controls with ecological diversity (Wooldridge, 2002).
Fifth, I employ a nearest neighbor matching estimator, taking diversity above the me-
dian as “treatment.”22 Sixth, I compute Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics.23 Finally, I use
fixed effects. In successive columns, I control for ethnographic region, United Nations
region,24 country,25 and language family.26 These are estimated using OLS. I do not use
these in the baseline because they will exacerbate measurement error. In an OLS regres-
sion, ethnographic region dummies explain 19% of the variance in state centralization
and 25% of the variance in ecological diversity.
5. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
The Ricardian view of African states better fits the data than six alternative interpre-
tations of the link between ecological diversity and states. Some of these are comple-
ments, rather than rivals, to the Ricardian view. Still, they do not fully account for the
relationship between ecology and states.
5.1. Larger areas aremorediverse and require centralizedadministration. States that
cover wider territories for reasons unrelated to their strength may have more levels of
jurisdiction (Spencer, 1998, 2010). These areas may be more diverse by construction. I
21In particular, I use the spatwmat and spatreg commands in Stata. I select the spatial adjacency matrix
W so that all societies whose centroids are within ten decimal degrees of each other are given a weight
inversely proportionate to their distance from each other.
22In particular, I use the nnmatch command in Stata.
23Replicating the main regression using OLS, I obtain the estimated coefficient on ecological diversity βˆ1
and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ1. Regressing state centralization on the controls, I obtain
the predicted values xb and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ2. Regressing ecological diversity
on xb, I obtain the coefficient estimate βˆ2. Altonji et al. (2005) suggest that if
βˆ1Vˆ2
βˆ2Vˆ1
> 1, it is unlikely that
unobservables will explain away the result of interest.
24I make the following assignments. Southern Africa: African Hunters, South African Bantu. Western
Africa: Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Moslem Sudan. Central Africa: Central Bantu,
Equatorial Bantu, Eastern Sudan. Eastern Africa: Northeast Bantu, Upper Nile, Ethiopia and Horn, Indian
Ocean.
25I assign each ethnic group to the country into which the largest slice of its territory falls.
26This is constructed from variables 98 and 99 in the Ethnographic Atlas.
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have three strategies for dismissing this alternative. First, I restrict the sample to soci-
eties of similar area. In Table 5, I show that results are robust if the smallest quintile (Q1),
largest quintile (Q5) or both are dropped. Second, I control for area directly in Table 5.
This is not done in the main analysis, because area is potentially endogenous. Results
are robust to this, as well as including the logarithm of area (not reported).
Third, I adopt the “virtual countries” approach of Michalopoulos (2011). I divide the
African continent into 1◦ by 1◦ squares and repeat the main analysis. I map these virtual
countries in the web appendix. Excepting coastal societies, these units have a uniform
shape and area.27 This exercise shows that, even conditioning on size and shape, diverse
areas are more likely to host states. Further, this mitigates the concern that multi-ethnic
states are “double-counted.” Some readers may prefer these “exogenous” units. I use
centralization of the strongest state in a square as its measure of centralization. Results,
in Table 5, are robust to this approach.
5.2. States conquer trading regions. States might emerge for reasons unrelated to the
gains from trade, and then occupy trading regions through migration or conquest. This
could only be conclusively ruled out using panel data – data that do not exist. I use
the cross section to make three arguments. First, the artificial country results above
suggest that diversity does not result from the irregularly-shaped boundaries of ethnic
groups that have conquered their surroundings. Second, if conquest requires that states
expand, I have shown above that controlling for area does not eliminate the main result.
Third, I give narrative evidence on some of the most statistically influential societies
in the data. This is effectively a very small panel taken from the larger cross section.
The eighteen most influential societies (by dfbeta) are listed in Table 7. If the central-
ized societies in this list developed states where they are or derived their wealth and
power from their proximity to trade routes, rather than migrating to capture trade, this
supports the Ricardian view. I choose six centralized states for case study evidence.28
To test the “Ricardian” view, I ask four questions about the Yoruba, Songhai, Toro,
Suku, Luba and Lozi. First, did these societies participate in trade? Second, was trade
a source of wealth for the society? Third, was trade a source of state power? Fourth,
did these states move to capture trading regions after they grew strong? I summarize
the answers in Table 7. Though two of these did conquer areas with tradable resources,
they relied on trade-related income to become powerful before expanding.
Yoruba. Morton-Williams (1969) argues that Yoruba Oyo “developed under the stim-
ulus of external trade,” benefiting initially from its proximity to northern trade routes,
27Because the length of a degree of longitude varies by distance from the equator, I have also replicated
the results in Table 5 down-weighting observations by the degree of this distortion. The results (not re-
ported) are nearly identical.
28I choose these, rather than non-centralized societies, because the alternative story being discussed is
specific to centralized ethnic groups and because the secondary historical literature is richer for these
groups. These were the six most influential states when a different baseline specification was used in
earlier versions of this paper.
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and later from coastal markets. Law (1977), similarly, links the rise of Oyo to its im-
ported cavalry, participation in long-distance northern commerce, and engagement in
the Atlantic slave trade.
Trade was important. Oyo cloth was sold to Dahomey and Porto Novo, and the state
imported kola nuts from forested areas of Yorubaland for consumption and re-export.
Salt and camwood were imported, and the latter was re-exported to Nupe. Cavalry
horses were imported from the north. The Alafin (king) relied on trade taxes for rev-
enue (Law, 1977). Even direct taxes were collected in currencies acquired through trade.
Trade upheld the Alafin’s authority by enabling him to distribute money and trade goods
while maintaining a superior lifestyle. He and other chiefs engaged in trade personally.
Neither Morton-Williams (1969) nor Law (1977) mention conquest of neighboring re-
gions as a pre-condition for trade.
Songhai. The Songhai Empire depended on trans-Saharan trade. Neumark (1977)
explains the success of Songhay and the states that preceded it using “their strategic
commercial position on the fringes of the Sahara.” Songhay exported gold and slaves, as
well as ivory, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers, skins, ebony, civet, malaguetta pepper,
and semi-precious stones. It re-exported cloth and leather goods from Hausaland and
kola from the forests. It imported salt, linen, silk, cotton cloth, copper goods, ironwork,
paper, books, weapons, cowries, beads, mirrors, dates, figs, sugar, cattle and horses.
This trade brought wealth; Leo Africanus noted the empire’s prosperity (Levzion, 1975).
Taxes on trade provided government revenue (Shillington, 1989). Lovejoy (1978) notes
that Songhay’s cities “controlled trans-Saharan trade, desert-side exchange, and river
traffic on the Niger. Located in the Sahil but with easy access to western and central
savanna, they were at the hub of overland and river routes where staples of desert-side
trade such as grain and salt could readily be transferred from river boat to camel, and
vice versa.”
Songhay did expand into the Hausa states to capture their fertile land and into Air to
drive out Tuareg raiders (Bovill, 1995). The latter was a movement to protect existing
trade interests, not to secure new routes. Songhay’s strength, like the states that came
before it, was based on its favorable location before it expanded.
Toro. The Toro region was one of relative prosperity, producing iron goods and salt for
sale within the interlacustrine region (Ingham, 1975). Trade was a source of state rev-
enue, through both tribute and direct control. The king, chiefs and lords of Toro main-
tained control over land, cattle, lakes, salt lakes, medicinal springs, canoe services, and
“certain commodities having exchange or prestige value,” such as tusks and lion skins
(Taylor, 1962). They collected goods as tribute, reallocating them to relatives, chiefs,
officials and others. Subordinate states introduced agents to collect tax from both salt
producers and traders, a portion of which was sent to Bunyoro (Ingham, 1975). The
Toro kings sold slaves, ivory and cows to Arab traders in return for guns and cloth (Tay-
lor, 1962). Toro was also an exporter of salt; until 1923, the okukama or Mukama (king)
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of Toro held personal ownership over the trade in salt from Lake Katwe and other lake
deposits near Kasenyi (Good, 1972). Toro did expand to take advantage of a tradable
resource. Lake Katwe, in Busongora, was an early conquest (Good, 1972). Salt was, how-
ever, only one of many tradable goods that enhanced the power of the Toro state.
Suku. The Suku of the Congolese savanna lacked a developed system of market places,
sold no cash crops and only limited rubber, and itinerant trade was “not at all devel-
oped” in the colonial era (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku did, however, participate as mid-
dlemen in the long-distance trade between the raffia and palm-oil producers north and
east of them and southern groups who traded directly with the Portuguese (Kopytoff,
1967). They purchased raw raffia for weaving into cloth, which was exported to the
southeast along with palm oil in return for shell money and European goods (Kopy-
toff, 1967). Though relatively poor, the Suku were known for their wealth in shell money
(Kopytoff, 1964).
The Suku MeniKongo (king) directly ruled villages around the capital and adminis-
tered the remainder through regional chiefs. Shell money was used to render tribute
(Kopytoff, 1964), and so direct taxes were indirectly taxes on trade. The effect of trade
on the Suku state was inherited in part from the Lunda, from whom Suku seceded
(Kopytoff, 1965). Within the Lunda’s territory lay both copper mines and salt, which
were sources of trade and tribute (Birmingham, 1976). Slaves for export were collected
through war and tributary tax collection, and this revenue allowed the royal court to
distribute the trade goods over which it held a near monopoly (Birmingham, 1976). The
Suku inherited state forms from their trading predecessor, and prospered from their po-
sition as middlemen.
Luba. Before they were unified, the separate Luba states controlled local dried fish,
salt, oil palm, raffia cloth, and copper-working industries (Birmingham, 1976). In the
late eighteenth century, Luba Lomami responded to the new long distance trade in ivory
and slaves, unifying the Luba (Birmingham, 1976). Traders exchanged cloth, beads and
cattle for tusks that were sold subject to taxation and supervision by either the royal
household or by chiefs (Birmingham, 1976). This trade was preceded by “pioneering
chiefs,” who advanced into new lands and arranged for the purchase of ivory while at
the same time creating “a more or less permanent Luba political superstructure” behind
which traders followed (Birmingham, 1976).
After 1780, the Luba expanded, first into the space between the Lualaba and Lake
Tanganyika, and later into the fishing and palm oil areas of the Lalaba lakes, the copper-
producing portions of the Samba, and the ivory-producing province of Manyema (Birm-
ingham, 1976). At its peak in the mid-nineteenth century, the empire presided over “a
wide-ranging and international trade” in oil, salt, poisons, drums, slaves, copper, palm
cloth, baskets, iron, skins and fish. Wilson (1972) argues that long-distance trade was
the cause of this expansion. The slave trade pushed the Luba to establish Kazembe as
a tributary kingdom. Birmingham (1976) argues that Luba decline followed that of the
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ivory trade. Their trading partners turned to focus on copper. Swahili-Arab traders be-
gan to trade directly into the forest, cutting out the Luba. The Luba became unable to
purchase the guns needed to secure their power without exporting internally captured
slaves.
Lozi. The pastoral Lozi occupy the Zambezi floodplain (Gluckman, 1941). Within Lozi
territory, trade was in the specialized products of each region, including bulrush millet
and cassava meal, wood products and iron (Gluckman, 1941). Before 1850, the Lozi sent
traders to the Lunda areas of the upper Zambezi, trading indirectly with the Portuguese
(Flint, 1970). By 1860, long distance trade, especially in ivory, became important (Flint,
1970). The Lozi exported cattle and forest products (Gluckman, 1941).
The king and princess chief collected tribute in kind from “tribes” under their com-
mand, including canoes, weapons, iron tools, meat, fish, fruit, salt, honey, maize and
manioc (Birmingham, 1976). The Kololo, who ruled the Lozi between 1840 and 1864,
obtained ivory as tribute and sold iron hoes to the Tonga. The Kololo king established
‘caravan chiefs’ and kept profits from ivory within his court (Flint, 1970). On re-gaining
independence, the Lozi king traded cattle, ivory and slaves for goods that he distributed
(Gluckman, 1941).
Public goods. Subjects and traders received greater peace and protection from these
states. The Toro “expected patronage - protection, justice, undisturbed occupation of
their land, and rewards especially in stock or chieftainships or honours for good service”
(Taylor, 1962, p 60). Lozi political authorities re-distributed tribute, sometimes to those
in need, serving as a “clearing house” (Gluckman, 1941, p. 73). Traders gave gifts to the
king, “for they traveled by his permission and largely, despite their muskets, under his
protection (p. 78).” Lewanika, for example, sent a punitive expedition against subject Ila
for having killed a party of traders (p. 79). Oyo caravans, similarly, often traveled under
cavalry protection (Law, 1975).
Summary. These cases are consistent with the Ricardian view. Songhai and Oyo ex-
panded, but did so after having arisen in locations favorable to trade. The Luba ex-
panded after 1780 based on power already acquired through the Bisa ivory trade. When
that trade declined, the kingdom collapsed. Lozi dominance over surrounding peoples
depended trade and tribute from the diverse products of their neighbors. That the Suku
participated in long-distance trade while possessing only limited internal markets high-
lights the importance of trade spanning macro-ecological regions. In every case, rulers
taxed trade. Though Toro conquered Busongora to capture the most important source
of salt in the region, it inherited its political structure from Bunyoro, which had previ-
ously grown strong due to its sale of metal goods and control of the Kibiro salt industry.
5.3. Islands of quality. If states emerge to protect “islands” of land quality that differ
from neighboring areas, these will also have diverse ecologies. In Table 5, I control for
the range of agricultural constraints – the difference in land quality between the best
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and worst points in a society’s territory. The effect of diversity remains significant. If I
control for a Theil index of agricultural constrains, the results are similar (not reported).
5.4. Population density. Ecological diversity may be correlated with population den-
sity, which itself explains pre-colonial African states (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2012).
I proxy for historic population density by measuring it in 1960.29 This is reported in Ta-
ble 5, and the effect of ecological diversity remains intact. This is also true if I include
the log of (one plus) population density (not reported).
5.5. Ethnic diversity. Ecology-specific human capital gives rise to a greater number of
ethnic groups in regions of diverse ecology (Michalopoulos, 2011). Competition be-
tween these groups may lead them to develop stronger states (Tilly, 1992). Alternatively,
more heterogeneous communities might form more sophisticated institutions to re-
duce conflict (Aghion et al., 2004). To show this is not driving my results, I return to
my sample of artificial countries. I count the number of ethnic groups that intersect
each square, and include this as an control in Table 5. The main result survives this.
It also survives controlling for modern-day heterogeneity, measured as the number of
languages reported in the World Language Mapping System (not reported).30
This alternative interpretation would also contradict several established findings. Eth-
nic diversity increases the cost of nation-building (Alesina et al., 2005), inhibits pub-
lic goods provision (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and predicts the break-up of nations
(Desmet et al., 2009).31 Ecological diversity overcomes both these potential effects of
greater ethnic diversity and the possible substitutability between trade openness and
nation-building (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (1997)).
5.6. Diversity and risk. Ecological diversity may increase the number of activities a so-
ciety can use to cope with risk and seasonal variation. It may permit animals to be
moved to take advantage of seasonal resources and avoid diseases (Beinart, 2007). I
have shown above that the results are not driven by societies dependant on animal hus-
bandry. Results are also robust to controlling for presence of bovines (not reported).
In Table 5, I show they are robust to adding subsistence diversity as a control. This is
a Herfindahl index computed from the income shares derived from hunting, fishing,
gathering, husbandry, and agriculture reported in the Ethnographic Atlas.
Cultivating a diverse set of grains may enable a state to better cope with risk (e.g.
McCann (1999)). If these grains are exchanged through intra-regional trade, this is not
inconsistent with an interpretation linking diversity to states through trade. Controlling
for a Herfindahl index constructed from the shares of each society’s territory that are
29Raster data are taken from http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
30The map can be purchased from http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/.
31Within artificial countries, the centralization of the median ethnic group is negatively related to the
number of ethnic groups (not reported). I have found no evidence that this relationship is non-
monotonic. The positive coefficient in Table 5 likely comes from selecting the maximum state from a
larger number of ethnic groups.
18 JAMES FENSKE
most suitable for the grains listed in plate 48 of the FAO-GAEZ data does not change the
main result (not reported).
6. MECHANISMS
6.1. How does trade cause states? To illustrate the possible mechanisms connecting
trade to state centralization, I introduce a simple model in appendix A. This is based
on Gennaioli and Voth (2011). In the model, a ruler extends his authority within his
ethnic group’s territory in order to tax trade. This trade cannot occur unless he offers
public goods that lower the costs of trade. These public goods could include dispute-
resolution services or physical protection. I do not specify whether these public goods
are used to facilitate trade with the citizens of neighboring states, or to promote internal
trade, since state services could lower trade costs in either case. I show that greater gains
from trade will lead the ruler to centrally administer a larger fraction of group’s territory.
In the model, there are three mechanisms by which trade may lead to states:
(1) Greater gains from trade will directly increase the profitability of state centraliza-
tion. It raises the tax base, allowing the ruler to extract greater revenues from the
territory he controls. Investment in public goods and administration becomes
worthwhile. Adding to this direct revenue effect, the ability of rulers to tax ex-
change and to trade on their own was highlighted by the case studies above.
(2) If greater access to trade makes it cheaper to project authority over space, cen-
tralization will increase. Access to trade can lower these costs. The ability to trade
for horses and for firearms made it easier for states such as Oyo and Songhai to
extend their power over space.
(3) If access to trade makes the ruler more effective at providing public goods, state
centralization becomes more profitable. Access to trade may give the ruler ac-
cess to goods that increase his authority in settling disputes and in demanding
that traders not be harassed. The Alafin (king) of Oyo gained prestige by main-
taining a superior lifestyle, while the Lozi and Toro rulers secured loyalty by re-
distributing the profits from trade. Cavalry and firearms could be used to extend
protection to traders.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether trade or centralization are
“good” outcomes in all cases, or whether states that depend on tradable resources for
revenues are “better” than states that have other sources of revenue (Brunnschweiler
and Bulte, 2008; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sachs and Warner, 2001).
6.2. Tradeand intermediate outcomes. Here, I test whether trade predicts specific out-
comes related to state formation. I find that ecological diversity is strongly associated
with class stratification, but not with local political structures or with religion. Trade in
the SCCS is correlated with a wide selection of state functions, rather than a few narrow
indicators of state capacity.
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Diminished local authority. The first possible mechanism is to take over the authority
of other smaller states in its vicinity. The atlas contains a variable (V32) that records the
number of “levels of local jurisdiction.” I take this as a crude measure of the strength of
local states, and use it as an outcome in place of state centralization in (1). While there is
a suggestive negative correlation between ecological diversity and local states when no
other controls are added, this is not robust to the inclusion of other variables. Similarly,
V72 records the rules for succession to the office of the local headman. I construct a
“headman is appointed” dummy if this rule is “appointment by higher authority.” In
Table 8, I show that there is no correlation in the data.
Islam. Islam diffused in Africa through trade networks that encouraged both tribal
unification and the adoption of Arabic (Insoll, 2003). This is one of the possible mech-
anisms linking trade to states. The data do not directly record Islam. They only state
whether high gods are “supportive of human morality.” This is only positive for a hand-
ful of societies outside of the Moslem Sudan, Western Sudan and Ethiopia, and so it is
effectively a dummy variable for either Christianity or Islam. This is only available for
a sample roughly half the size of the main sample, and does not appear to be related
to ecological diversity in Table 8. Similarly, if I include it as a control, the coefficient on
ecological diversity falls, but remains significant (not reported). Islam, then, does not
drive the correlation between trade and states in the data.
Class stratification. Trade allowed kings to amass wealth through taxation, letting
them gain prestige and control the flow of tribute. To test for this mechanism, I use V66,
“class stratification among freemen,” which is divided into five levels. In order, these are
“absence among freemen,” “wealth distinctions,” “elite,” “dual,” and “complex.” Eco-
logical diversity positively predicts this in Table 8. Results (not reported) are similar if a
binary class stratification measure is used. Though recent trade models argue that trade
increases inequality by raising incomes of abundant factors, increasing skill premia, and
through search frictions in import-competing sectors (Harrison et al., 2011), these are
of limited relevance to pre-industrial societies. Instead, rulers’ access to prestige goods,
trade goods, and tax revenues are more likely mechanisms.
Specific state functions. I test whether the various measures of state centralization in
the SCCS’s global sample are correlated with any of the forms of trade mentioned in that
source in the web appendix. Trade in food and the importance of trade in subsistence
are related with the greatest number of state functions. The degree of police specializa-
tion and the level of the highest political office are correlated with all the trade measures.
The degree to which the executive is concentrated in a single person, the presence of a
judiciary and the level of highest overarching jurisdiction are correlated with all but one.
Many types of trade, then, are related to several state-related outcomes in the SCCS – no
one type of trade operates through one specific mechanism.32
32Other outcomes may be of interest to the reader. Ecological diversity does predict area in an OLS re-
gression, and this is robust to both the standard controls and regional fixed effects (not reported). I have
found no relationship between ecological diversity and urbanization measured by cities in 1850 reported
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6.3. What sort of trade matters? Endowments of tradable products. The ecological di-
versity measure cannot capture all forms of trade. In Table 8, I test whether other sources
of trade – fishing, iron, gold, and salt – give similar rise to states. These data do not mea-
sure trade in these products, only the capacity to trade. Coefficients can be thought of
as intent-to-treat effects.
A society’s percentage dependance on fishing is V3 in the Ethnographic Atlas. I find no
correlation between this and states. To test the importance of minerals, I take data from
the US Geological Service’s Mineral Resources Program.33 These records contain data
on both metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources at specific sites. “Iron” is the num-
ber of sites of iron production found within an ethnic group’s territory, and “gold” is the
number of sites of gold production. If there is any bias from using modern data, it will be
positive, since modern states that have inherited the strength of their pre-colonial pre-
decessors should be better able to exploit their countries’ resources. Despite this, I find
no evidence that iron matters.34 Gold enters significantly when no controls are added,
though the effect of gold is marginally insignificant with controls. “Salt” is the number
of salt-producing cites listed by Sundstro¨m (1974) within an ethnic group’s territory.35
This too appears irrelevant.
Types of trade. I also test whether state centralization is correlated with any particular
form of trade in the SCCS’s global sample. In the web appendix, I present the correla-
tions between these indicators and state centralization. Societies with states are more
likely to trade for food, through more levels of intermediation, and this trade is more
important to their subsistence. Political power is more likely to depend on commerce
in more centralized states, trade and markets are more likely to exist, and exchange is
more important both within the community. Interestingly, this suggests that it is more
mundane, intra-community trade in products such as food that matters.
Local and long distance trade. Despite this suggestive finding, the main data sources
here do not allow for these two types of trade to be conclusively tested against each
other. I show in Table 8 that the presence of historical trade routes is correlated with
state centralization. This does not, however, rule out the importance of local trade.
Similarly, while “ecological diversity” is intended as a proxy for intra-ethnic trade and
by Chandler and Fox (1974) (not reported).
Similarly, some readers may be interested in how ecological diversity and pre-colonial states relate to
colonial outcomes. I show in the web appendix that ethnic groups whose largest slice of territory was
conquered by Britain were generally more diverse and more centralized than those captured by France,
but less than those not colonized. Within the British empire, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2010) have
found early twentieth century real wages were much higher in West Africa than East Africa. If there is
any pattern apparent, it is that ethnic groups in Britain’s East African conquests were more diverse and
centralized than those in Ghana and Nigeria, though Sierra Leone is an exception.
33The data are available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/
34I similarly find no result if I use the number of iron-producing sites within a group’s territory listed by
Sundstro¨m (1974) as a measure of iron.
35Of 271 sites he lists, I match 84 to ethnic groups in the data and 157 to specific geographic locations, such
as Cape Lopez. For 30 I could not find a match. The full table of matches is given in the Web Appendix.
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“distance from an ecological boundary” is meant to capture long distance trade, I show
in the web appendix that including both in the same regression does not allow their
effects to be disentangled. They are strongly correlated, and both coefficients fall rela-
tively 40% relative to their values in Tables 2 and 3.
6.4. Does historical trade matter today? It is not the case today that all African coun-
tries have strong states. Even today, a one standard deviation increase in the Gennaioli
and Rainer (2007) index of State Centralization predicts a 0.3 standard deviation drop
in The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index for 2012.36 Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2012) have shown that pre-colonial states predict greater levels of contemporary devel-
opment, as measured by the intensity of night-time lights. In Table 9, I show that histor-
ical trade can be used to instrument for these ethnic institutions. Column (1) replicates
the main result from Table 3A in their paper: conditional on controls and country fixed
effects, “ethnic” institutions predict present-day luminosity. Column (2) uses ecologi-
cal diversity as an instrument for these pre-colonial states. The IV estimate is positive
and significant. This supports a causal interpretation of the results in Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2012); ecological conditions that no longer directly influence trade
predict institutions continue to matter in the present.
7. CONCLUSION
I have used this paper to provide empirical support for Bates’s (1983) Ricardian view
of pre-colonial African states. The gains from trade stemming from ecological diver-
sity predict the presence of state centralization across sub-Saharan societies recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas. Moving from a homogenous zone to one that is ecologically
diverse predicts that the chance a society is centralized rises by more than 10 percentage
points. There is no evidence that the effect is overstated due to endogeneity, or is due
to the influence of outliers or specific ethnographic regions. The histories of African
societies are consistent with this interpretation of the data, rather than one in which
states emerge and then migrate. Similarly, area, defense of fertile islands, correlation
with dense population, risk mitigation, and ethnic competition do not explain away the
results. Ecological diversity predicts centralization outside of Africa, and continues to
matter in the present through the legacy of pre-colonial states.
What does this result add to our understanding of the link between institutions and
development in the present? First, it suggests that other findings that have been inter-
preted as effects of culture may operate through institutions. For example, the result in
Durante (2009) that historical experience with mutual insurance leads to greater levels
of trust may arise through the institutional consequences of mutually-insuring trade.
Second, institutions have heterogeneous effects on development, and part of this het-
erogeneity is both path-dependent and context-specific. The mechanisms that shaped
pre-colonial states in Africa continue to shape development in the present.
36In this bivariate regression, n=47, p=0.041.
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APPENDIX A. MODEL
An ethnic group exists on a unit interval, stretching from 0 to 1. The natural ruler of
the ethnic group lives at point 0. He chooses S ∈ [0, 1], the fraction of the ethnic group’s
territory to bring under his direct jurisdiction. That is, he will choose the level of state
centralization. He will do this in order to tax the inhabitants in their trading activities.
I will show that greater gains from trade will lead him to centralize a larger fraction of
group’s territory.
The territory is inhabited by a continuum of agents of mass 1. They are spread uni-
formly over the interval. Each of these agents chooses between one of two activities:
farming and trading. The returns from farming are normalized to 1. Farming cannot be
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taxed. Trading, if successful, gives a return of θ > 1. Trading can be taxed, and so an
agent who lives within the centralized state pays a tax rate of τ ∈ [0, 1] on trade income.
τ is chosen by the ruler. Agents who live outside the state pay no tax.
In addition to being taxable, trading is also costly. If the agent chooses trading, it en-
tails a cost of q. This could represent, for example, the cost of avoiding theft or resolving
disputes. The net income from trade is, then, (1− τ)θ − q. Agents will engage in trade if
(1− τ)θ − q ≥ 1.
As the ruler expands the size of the state, he provides public goods to his subjects
that lower q. These could include dispute-resolution services or physical protection. In
particular, if the ruler spends p units of revenue per unit of territory on public goods, the
cost of trade is q = 1
γp
. Here, γ is a parameter that captures the effectiveness of public
goods. Agents outside the state receive no public goods. For them, q is infinite, and no
trade is possible.
The ruler is self-interested, and maximizes his net revenues. If he brings a piece of
territory under his jurisdiction, he will ensure that p and τ are set such that all of the
subjects choose trade, rather than agriculture. Otherwise, he cannot collect any taxes
from them. He must select p and τ such that (1−τ)θ−q ≥ 1. In addition to expenditures
on public goods, pS, the ruler must pay a cost to extend his authority over space. This
takes the form cS2. c > 0 is a parameter that captures the costs of projecting power. If
the ruler controls a territory of length S, and all of the inhabitants engage in trade rather
than agriculture, his net revenue will be (θτ − p)S− cS2. Given a state of size S, the ruler
maximizes:
V R(S) = max
τ,p
(θτ − p)S − cS2(5)
s.t.(1− τ)θ − 1
γp
≥ 1(6)
Because net revenue is obviously increasing in τ and decreasing in p, the constraint
in (6) will bind. The ruler will be compelled to choose τ and p such that τ = 1 − 1+γp
θγp
.
When this is substituted into (5), the ruler’s problem can be solved from its first order
conditions. At an interior solution, these give the ruler’s optimal p and τ :
p∗ =
√
1
γ
τ ∗ =
θ − 1
θ
− 1
θ
√
γ
If θτ ∗ ≤ p∗, then γ and θ are such that no territory can be administered profitably. For
a given S, the ruler will choose to set τ = p = 0 in order to minimize his losses. The
ruler’s net revenue, conditional on S, can now be written as:
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V R(S) = max
{(
θ − 2
√
1
γ
− 1
)
S − cS2,−cS2
}
If the ruler maximizes this with respect to S, the degree of state centralization that
maximizes the ruler’s self interest is:
S∗ = min
{
1,max
{
1
2c
(
θ − 2
√
1
γ
− 1
)
, 0
}}
(7)
Define θL as the value of θ that solves θτ ∗ = p∗. This is the minimum θ for which
any state centralization is profitable. Below this threshold, the ruler does not bring any
of the ethnic group’s territory under his control. Similarly, define θH as the level of θ for
which S∗ = 1. For this level of θ and above, the ruler centralizes the entire territory. If θ ∈
(θL, θH), three results hold that highlight mechanisms by which ecologically-determined
gains from trade spurred state centralization in pre-colonial Africa:
(1) ∂S
∗
∂θ
> 0. Greater gains from trade will directly increase the profitability of state
centralization.
(2) ∂S
∗
∂c
< 0. If greater access to trade makes it cheaper to project authority over
space, centralization will increase.
(3) ∂S
∗
∂γ
> 0. If access to trade makes the ruler more effective at providing public
goods, state centralization becomes more profitable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
State centralization 1.15 0.93 0 4 440
Any centralization 0.73 0.44 0 1 440
Local state 2.91 0.68 2 4 439
Class stratification 1.25 1.41 0 4 364
Headman appointed 0.066 0.25 0 1 320
Light density 1.50 0.18 1.15 3.34 440
Ecological diversity 0.30 0.23 0 0.80 440
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.47 0.23 0 0.80 440
Ecological polarization 0.51 0.38 0 1.00 440
Dist. ecological boundary 0.45 0.53 0.019 2.95 440
Any diversity 0.78 0.42 0 1 440
Salt 0.42 0.88 0 6 440
Gold production 0.34 1.86 0 24 440
Iron production 0.12 0.33 0 1 440
% dep. on fishing 8.32 10.9 0 70 440
Major river 0.23 0.42 0 1 440
Ag. constraints 5.41 1.06 2.94 8.92 440
Dist. coast 5.54 3.76 0 14.9 440
Elevation 728 520 -7.41 2,308 440
Malaria 0.83 0.27 0 1 440
Precipitation 846 468 0 2,474 440
Ruggedness 71,792 70,413 0 421,381 440
Temperature 8,882 1,112 5,295 10,699 440
Dist. L. Victoria 2,198 1,438 131 5,708 440
Date observed 1,919 21.6 1,830 1,960 440
Dist. Atlantic ST 6,688 1,515 3,671 9,949 440
Dist. Indian ST 4,546 1,589 1,028 7,953 440
Dist. Saharan ST 3,333 975 806 6,999 440
Dist. Red ST 2,887 1,360 107 5,773 440
Crop: None 0.025 0.16 0 1 440
Crop: Trees 0.084 0.28 0 1 440
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.19 0.39 0 1 440
Log rainfall range 5.18 1.01 1.39 7.42 370
Area 2.43 3.64 8.2e-06 27.0 440
Pop. density 22.2 28.5 0 311 440
Ag. constraints range 4.66 1.95 0 9 440
Subsistence diversity 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.74 440
Other variables used
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Outcomes
Gains from trade
Controls
Ecological diversity
Eco. Div. (FAO)
Other controls
Observations
Pseudo R-squared
Continuous > median Continuous > median Continuous > median Continuous > median
0 levels -0.259*** -0.108*** -0.225*** -0.090*** -0.363*** -0.123*** -0.270*** -0.081*
(0.087) (0.033) (0.070) (0.025) (0.079) (0.037) (0.092) (0.045)
1 level -0.022 -0.009 -0.024 -0.010 0.119*** 0.039*** 0.124*** 0.036**
(0.038) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.036) (0.014) (0.044) (0.019)
2 levels 0.152*** 0.063*** 0.152*** 0.061*** 0.138*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.022*
(0.052) (0.019) (0.051) (0.018) (0.032) (0.015) (0.026) (0.013)
3 levels 0.118*** 0.050*** 0.093*** 0.038*** 0.084*** 0.029*** 0.053** 0.016
(0.044) (0.018) (0.035) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011)
4 levels 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.022*** 0.008** 0.019* 0.006
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Coefficient estimates where ecological
diversity is replaced with an "above median" indicator are not reported. Other controls in columns (1) and (2) are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast,
elevation, malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless
otherwise specified. Other controls in columns (3) and (4) are land quality, distance from coast, elevation, malaria, rainfall, temperature, date, crop dummies, major river,
ruggedness and absolute latitude.
(3) (4)
Table 2. Ecological diversity predicts states
Marginal effects
0.122 0.163
State centralization
(0.199) (0.236)
Yes Yes
1,077 637
Whole world
0.0111 0.070
 Excl. sub-Saharan Africa
0.913*** 0.713***
0.794***
(0.266)
0.719***
(0.239)
Sub-Saharan Africa
(1) (2)
No
440
Yes
440
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any cent. Cent. > 1
Ecological diversity 0.272** 0.271***
(0.126) (0.096)
Dist. ecological boundary -0.303***
(0.069)
Ecological polarization 0.370***
(0.132)
Any diversity 0.355**
(0.145)
Ecological diversity (Simpler classes) 0.806**
(0.316)
Ecological diversity (High density areas) 0.643***
(0.210)
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.996***
(0.281)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, except with "any centralization" as the outcome, in which case probit is used with
marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation,
ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
Table 3. The main result holds with alternative measures of states and diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological diversity 0.559*** 0.606*** 2.676*** 3.840***
(0.167) (0.188) (0.949) (1.472)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 370 440 370
F-statistic 66.80 16.17
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Log rainfall range 0.090*** 0.185** 0.034*** 0.048***
(0.029) (0.076) (0.004) (0.011)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 370 440 370
IV
OLS: First Stage
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region.
Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation,
malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance
from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise
specified. The excluded instrument is the log rainfall range. In columns 3, 5, and 7,
missing values of the log rainfall range are recoded to zero. In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8,
these observations are excluded. 
Table 4. The main result is robust to reverse causation
Ecological diversity
OLS: Reduced form
OLS: Baseline
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Including 
area shares
Latitude 
longitude 
cubic
 Spatially 
correlated 
errors  Spatial lag Conley's OLS
 Including 
neighbors' X
Interactions 
with de-
meaned 
controls
Ecological diversity 0.981*** 0.673*** 0.508** 0.532*** 0.559*** 0.583*** 0.748***
(0.284) (0.212) (0.216) (0.200) (.199) (0.200) (0.259)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440 440
Wald test (λ=0) 1.221
Wald test (ρ=0) 4.428
WX p 0
Moran p 0.273
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Nearest 
neighbor 
matching
Altonji-
Elder-Taber 
Statistic
Ethno. 
region F.E.
UN region 
F.E. Country F.E.
Lang. family 
F.E.
Ecological diversity 0.336* 0.521** 0.325* 0.347**
(0.170) (0.183) (0.164) (0.140)
Above Median Diversity SATE 0.265***
(0.100)
Altonji-Elder-Taber Statistic 4.77
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 437
Table 5. The main result is robust to unobserved heterogeneity
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, excepting the spatial estimators as noted in
the text, and columns (10) through (13), which are OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region, excepting spatial estimators as
noted in the text. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation, ruggedness,
temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Artificial 
countries
Artificial 
countries Drop Area Q1 Drop Area Q5 
Drop Area Q1 and 
Q5
Ecological diversity 0.450*** 0.418*** 0.890*** 0.671** 0.982***
(0.114) (0.120) (0.274) (0.264) (0.288)
No. of Ethnic Groups 0.105***
(0.039)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1523 1523 440 440 440
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Ecological diversity 0.686*** 0.548** 0.697*** 0.731***
(0.233) (0.259) (0.234) (0.240)
Area 0.019
(0.023)
Ag. Constraints Range 0.065*
(0.036)
Pop. density 0.001
(0.002)
Subsistence diversity -0.328
(0.557)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation,
ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless
otherwise specified. 
Table 6. The Ricardian interpretation better explains the main result than six alternatives
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Name Cent. dfbeta Name Cent. dfbeta
Songhai 3 0.18 Luba 3 0.11
Yoruba 3 0.18 Kunama 0 0.11
Chiga 0 0.16 Rundi 3 0.09
Laketonga 0 0.15 Fur 3 0.09
Bagirmi 3 0.15 Akyem 2 0.09
Lozi 3 0.15 Tigon 0 0.09
Toro 3 0.15 Lokele 0 0.08
Barea 0 0.12 Bombesa 0 0.08
Shuwa 2 0.12 Suku 3 0.08
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
 Yoruba  Songhai  Toro  Suku  Luba  Lozi
Participated in trade?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade a source of wealth?  Yes  Yes  Yes Unclear  Yes  Yes
Trade a source of state power?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
No capture of trading regions?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
These summarize the results of the case studies described in the text.
Table 7. The Ricardian interpretation is consistent with the histories of six influential states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local state
Class 
Stratification
Headman is 
appointed High gods
Ecological diversity -0.200 1.514*** 0.035 -0.029
(0.249) (0.221) (0.136) (0.884)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 439 364 320 242
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% dep. on fishing 0.003
(0.004)
Iron production 0.041
(0.164)
Gold production 0.020
(0.016)
Salt 0.032
(0.055)
Hist. trade route 0.526***
(0.158)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported, except column
(5), which is OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are major river, agricultural
constraints, distance to coast, elevation, malaria, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, distance to Lake
Victoria, distance from the four major slave trades, and dummies for crop type, unless otherwise specified. 
Table 8. Trade supports class stratification, and no one type of trade matters most
(1) (2)
OLS IV
State centralization 0.279*** 0.810**
(0.066) (0.361)
Other controls Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F 12.09
Observations 683 683
Table 9. Ecological diversity is an instrument for state centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region.
Other controls are distance to capital, distance to coast, distance to border, log
water area, log land area, elevation, suitability for agriculture, malaria ecology,
petroleum and diamonds.
Light Density
